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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Google is an Internet service provider that maintains and operates the 
world’s most popular search engine. Given that it recently entered a Non-
Prosecution Agreement with the Department of Justice—and forfeited $500 
million in the process—it is no surprise the company would want to halt, through a 
wholesale federal injunction, any investigation into its conduct by any State 
Attorneys General.  Yet, what is surprising is that the district court allowed Google 
to stop in its tracks a State investigation that barely has begun. What is more 
bizarre is that the district court enjoined the Attorney General of the State of 
Mississippi from filing future civil or criminal “charges” against Google. This all 
was accomplished in the name of federal law without the court ever invalidating, 
or even calling into question, state law.  
The Attorney General has not found Google to be in violation of any state 
law. Nor has the Attorney General filed a lawsuit or commenced any prosecution 
against Google. The Attorney General only has initiated an investigation, through a 
duly-issued state administrative subpoena, to discover whether Google’s conduct 
violates state law.  In these circumstances, the district court’s two-fold preliminary 
injunction falls out of step with settled federal law, and it deals a significant blow 
to fundamental principles of federalism and comity. This interlocutory appeal is a 
challenge to that granted preliminary injunction. 
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Because this appeal raises important issues of constitutional law and the 
precarious impact of distorted federal law on a sovereign State’s ability to enforce 
its laws and investigate potentially unlawful conduct within its jurisdiction, and 
because this Court may wish to closely consider the cases that mark the path to 
reversal, the Attorney General requests oral argument under Fed. R. App. P. 34. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The district court found that it had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331, and this Court has appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s grant of a 
preliminary injunction.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); Janvey v. Alguire, 647 
F.3d 585, 591-92 (5th Cir. 2011). A notice of appeal was timely filed on March 23, 
2015, and an amended notice of appeal was timely filed on March 31, 2015, after 
the district court entered its memorandum opinion. ROA.23-24; 2074; 2109.  
 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err by enjoining the Attorney General from filing 
an enforcement action on an administrative subpoena in state court pursuant to 
state law? 
2. Is the district court’s injunction prohibiting the Attorney General from 
filing future hypothetical civil or criminal “charges” under Mississippi law against 
Google in state court overly broad and in error when the injunction’s legal 
conclusion would be a disputed material fact to be litigated if a state court lawsuit 
ever was brought?  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE  
Facts Relevant to Appellate Review.  Up until December 19, 2014, when 
Google preemptively filed suit, this case followed a typical investigatory path, 
especially when viewed in the context of the nature of the investigation, and the 
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sheer size of the entity being investigated. In chronological fashion, that path is as 
follows: 
 2011.  In 2011, Google entered a Non-Prosecution Agreement with the 
Department of Justice after authorities alleged that Google was aiding overseas 
pharmacies in illegally marketing prescription drugs in the United States. 
ROA.157; 199-213; 1176-1198; 1401. Although Google already has paid $500 
million to resolve such allegations, State Attorneys General have reason to believe 
that Google’s services still are being used for unlawful activities. ROA.374-375; 
472-531; 640-650; 927-1005; 1049-1096; 1176-1198; 1199-1200; 1240-1242; 
1245-1246; 1421-1425. 
 2012. In late 2012, the Intellectual Property Committee of the National 
Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”) met to discuss efforts to address the 
online sale of stolen intellectual property and unauthorized prescription drugs. 
ROA.38. 
2013.  The following year, on February 13, 2013, Attorneys General from 
Hawaii, Virginia, and Mississippi wrote to search engines regarding a “concern[ ] 
about infringing activities[,]” including the “economic impact” and the “risk” to 
“consumers’ health and safety” from “the sale of counterfeit products[.]” 
ROA.374. After this letter, Google entered into an Assurance of Voluntary 
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Compliance as part of a multi-state investigation by State Attorneys General 
pertaining to a Google product called Google Street View. ROA.1201-1239.  
Thereafter, on April 1, 2013, Attorney General Hood transmitted a letter to 
Google regarding the issues set out in the February letter. ROA.376-378. The April 
letter stated that various Attorneys General “are interested in achieving a consensus 
on voluntary action that members of the search and ecommerce community can 
take to eliminate or significantly reduce infringing activities,” but that “if voluntary 
actions will not suffice, we will take legal action to change behavior to protect 
consumers and the integrity of the economic commerce on the Internet.” ROA.378. 
In April and May of 2013, respectively, Google responded to the February letter to 
search engines and to General Hood’s April letter. ROA.379-385; 386-388.  
On May 21, 2013, General Hood responded to Google, noting that Google’s 
responses were “insufficient” and that, if Google did not provide responsive 
answers, he would “call on” “attorneys general to issue civil investigative 
demands[.]” ROA.389-391. Google’s legal counsel responded to the Attorney 
General’s “inquiry” on June 10, 2013. ROA.397-398.   
General Hood followed suit on the same day, stating as follows: 
The State of Mississippi [ ] is investigating and evaluating Google’s 
conduct related to its search algorithm, auto-complete feature, 
advertising policies, and any other related functions. The purpose of 
this investigation is to determine whether there exist any violations of 
Mississippi law. One of the many potential outcomes of the ongoing 
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investigation could be civil or criminal litigation arising under state 
law. 
 
ROA.397.  
Shortly thereafter, on July 2, 2013, Attorneys General from Nebraska and 
Oklahoma wrote to Google regarding “Google’s subsidiary, YouTube.” 
ROA.1240-1242. On October 7, 2013, four Attorneys General, including General 
Hood, also wrote Google regarding YouTube and noted that they “hope[d] to work 
constructively with Google[.]” ROA.624-625. Then, on November 8, 2013, Google 
entered into yet another Assurance of Voluntary Compliance with thirty-seven 
states and the District of Columbia related to Google’s posting of information to 
Apple’s Safari Brower. ROA.1201-1239. 
 On November 27, 2013, General Hood transmitted a letter to Google 
responding to a letter Google’s legal counsel had authored.1 ROA.640-650. This 
letter outlined Google’s conduct and why it “raises serious questions as to whether 
Google is engaged in unlawful conduct itself.” ROA.640-650. That letter, in 
pertinent part, explained as follows: “Google would have us believe that it is a 
passive search engine . . . Google’s admissions, however, to the United States[,] 
the admissions in its letter, and Google’s own public proclamations belie such 
                                                 
1
 As part of the investigatory process, and that leading up to it, the Attorney General 
publically has acknowledged that he enlisted the assistance of various individuals and/or firms 
with knowledge and expertise concerning the issues at hand as well as those who were victims of 
potential violations of Mississippi’s consumer protection laws. ROA.1446.   
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claims . . . [Google] is not being investigated or pursued for the conduct of others.” 
ROA.640-650.  
Google responded the same day: 
 Google wishes to continue our substantive engagement with you and 
other Attorneys General on the important issues raised in your letter . . 
. We hope that we can find a mutually agreeable time to meet in the 
near future . . . We welcome hearing about instances in which our 
services are being misused . . . 
 
ROA.651.  
After this letter, on December 10, 2013, twenty-three Attorneys General 
again wrote Google, advising that “a growing number of state Attorneys General 
have expressed concerns regarding troubling and harmful problems posed by 
several of Google’s products.” ROA.722-723. 
2014.  On January 23, 2014, Google authored a letter to General Hood, with 
nine other Attorneys General copied, concerning a recent meeting between Google 
and a number of Attorneys General. ROA.744-745. In that letter, Google expressed 
that it “look[ed] forward to continuing th[e] dialogue and making progress to 
address the issues raised[.]” ROA.744. Google, in addition, noted that the “meeting 
was constructive” and that the company was “committed to continuously refining 
[its] enforcement efforts and [the company] welcome[d] [the] continuing thoughts 
to help [it] further improve [its] products and services.” ROA.745. Five Attorneys 
General responded to this letter. ROA.746-748; 749-757. 
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On October 21, 2014, after this dialogue between Google and various 
Attorneys General, General Hood served Google with the administrative subpoena 
that forms the basis of this lawsuit. ROA.1097-1175. 
 Relevant Procedural History.  Google was served with the subpoena 
pursuant to the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act (“MCPA”), Miss. Code § 75-
24-27, on October 21, 2014. ROA.1097-1175. It is undisputed that the issuance of 
the subpoena was a valid exercise of the Attorney General’s authority under state 
law. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-24-27; 75-24-9; 75-24-5. The stated basis of the 
subpoena was information that provided the Attorney General “reasonable grounds 
to believe that Google has used trade practices that are unfair, deceptive, and 
misleading” in violation of state law. ROA.1097-1098. 
Google’s response to the subpoena was due on November 20, 2014, but, by 
agreement of the parties, that deadline was extended to January 5, 2015. ROA.53. 
Instead of again requesting time to respond, or properly challenging the subpoena 
in state court, Google filed a federal lawsuit on December 19, 2014. ROA.30-63. 
The district court thereafter granted Google a preliminary injunction. ROA.2025-
2028; 2084-2108. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This is not your run-of-the-mill preliminary injunction. Two consequences 
alone prove that. First, the injunction prohibits the chief law enforcement officer of 
      Case: 15-60205      Document: 00513088659     Page: 21     Date Filed: 06/22/2015
7 
 
a sovereign state from fulfilling a lawfully charged duty to investigate potentially 
unlawful conduct and enforce state law. Second, a company charged with 
complying with state law may not have to. Needless to say, this is a perverse 
exercise of federal jurisdiction.  
There is no lawsuit pending against Google; there is only a non-self-
executing investigative subpoena. Mississippi state law, like many states, allows 
for the issuance and enforcement of administrative subpoenas under its consumer 
protection statutes. The statutory framework undisputedly was followed here. 
Under that statute, the Attorney General can issue a subpoena requesting 
information.  Importantly, though, only a state court can compel compliance, and 
the state court only can do so after notice to the recipient of the subpoena and a 
hearing.  
Google preferred not to respond in full to the subpoena issued to it, and it 
preferred not to honor state law or avail itself to the channels set forth under state 
law to quash or narrow the subpoena. It instead attempted an end-run to federal 
court to get a preliminary injunction. Not only did the district court acquiesce, but 
the court issued a “blunderbuss” injunction against future action by the Attorney 
General. 
Administrative subpoenas are common investigatory tools for agencies in 
Mississippi and many other states, and many of the statutory frameworks are 
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similar to the ones set forth in MCPA.  If the district court’s opinion is allowed to 
stand, it no doubt will serve to mute agency investigations across the State, and 
across the nation. In the future, parties will not respond to an administrative 
subpoena, cooperate in any state investigation, or even challenge the subpoena in 
state court, as required, when the state procedures so easily may be hijacked. While 
the injunction issued here is directed at Mississippi’s Attorney General, the effect 
of the injunction does not end with this Officer, or the State of Mississippi.   
A look at the injunction paints the story of why. The sweeping injunction 
enjoins the Attorney General in two respects. ROA.2025-2028. First, the granted 
injunction prohibits the Attorney General from seeking to “enforce[e]” the duly-
issued state administrative subpoena.  Second, the injunction broadly and 
confusingly prohibits the Attorney General from bringing “charges” against 
Google “under Mississippi law for making accessible third-party content to 
Internet users,” even though the State’s subpoena was not investigating third-party 
content and the injunction’s legal conclusion often turns on a question of fact.  
Neither prong of the injunction holds up, either procedurally or substantively.  
Injunction One. By statute, the subpoena issued to Google is not self-
executing.  At worst, then, if Google simply refused to answer the subpoena, the 
Attorney General would have to initiate an enforcement proceeding in state court. 
On these facts, to reach the conclusion that irreparable harm will be caused simply 
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by seeking to enforce the subpoena, the lower court had to postulate, without basis, 
that the state court would act unconstitutionally and allow Google’s federal rights 
to be violated. This is an untenable suggestion for irreparable harm, and it 
incorrectly deviates from the notions of “our federalism” that date back centuries 
and fortify the Court’s abstention decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 
(1971). 
Also unavailing are Google’s likelihood of success arguments. A lawsuit has 
not been filed against Google, and none of the claims urged preclude an 
investigation, or serve to forbid the Attorney General from asking the state court to 
enforce the subpoena. This alone is defeating of injunction one, but a more detailed 
analysis of the asserted claims shows why.  
The parties agree that the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”) provides 
Google with some level of immunity from suit for certain actions. Google is not 
satisfied with the immunity that Congress has provided, though, so the company 
has demanded unfettered immunity, including immunity from investigation. 
Simply put, the CDA does not offer that—even to Google. 
Neither does a potential First Amendment defense. The First Amendment 
does not categorically insulate a company from an investigation into unlawful 
activity, and Google should not be able to use the possibility of an eventual First 
Amendment defense, on what is now a factually undeveloped record, to 
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preemptively shut down the State’s investigation.  The same is true for Google’s 
cursory preemption arguments made under the Copyright Act and the Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”). These federal laws do not preempt a State 
investigation, and, at this investigatory stage, Google did not (because it cannot) 
credibly suggest that the information sought by the subpoena could support only 
preempted claims, rather than any number of non-preempted state law actions.  
The Fourth Amendment also cannot serve as a basis to shut down the State’s 
investigation ab initio. Even should the federal court place itself as the “first line” 
of review for state administrative subpoenas, the Attorney General’s investigatory 
subpoena meets the “minimal” and “strictly limited” review conducted by federal 
courts of federal agency subpoenas. 
When it comes to comparison of harms, the district court’s inquiry is 
curious.  The court’s analysis turned abruptly on the fact that the State purportedly 
will not be harmed because it can investigate “other matters.” ROA.2106-2107. 
(“The Attorney General will not be able to move on matters at issue herein, 
namely, the enforcement of the subpoena and the filing of charges against Google, 
but he still may conduct an investigation and file an action regarding other matters 
that are within his jurisdiction.”). Such a rationale does nothing to establish that an 
injunction should issue to Google, and it amounts only to an indecorous retreat 
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from core principles of comity, as it judicially dictates who a sovereign State may 
investigate under its own constitutionally-sound state laws.  
On this point, the public interest inquiry is not close. It cannot legitimately 
be disputed that the State has a significant interest in enforcing its enacted laws. 
This especially is true when those laws, such as the MCPA, are designed to protect 
the public. Few things, in fact, can tip the scales more sharply against the type of 
injunction issued by the district court.  
Injunction Two.  Federal Rule 65 “was designed to prevent uncertainty and 
confusion on the part of those faced with injunctive orders[.]” Schmidt v. Lessard, 
414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974).  That test is simple, but it is one in which the second-
prong of the injunction fails. The injunction’s dictates are specious, and the relief 
leaves the Attorney General open to a contempt proceeding should he ever file a 
suit against Google—and lose. 
Google has urged that the injunction is narrow; that it prohibits only that 
which is prohibited by federal law. Google’s assertion is disingenuous. Neither the 
CDA nor any other law at issue here provides across-the-board immunity. The 
injunction, therefore, must presuppose both that federal law disallows the gathering 
of facts and that whether conduct is immunized or protected never can be a 
question of fact.  This is belied, however, by the fact that courts have denied 
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motions to dismiss based on immunity, including Google’s own motions, due to 
fact questions. 
Similarly, there is no irreparable harm or likelihood of success. To reach 
either argument, the Court would have to engage in pure academic guesswork as to 
what “charge” would be filed, including if one ever would be filed at all.  From 
this, it is evident that many of Google’s so-called claims amount only to premature 
defenses. What’s more is that the injunction’s prohibiting of future “charges” 
presumes that the State’s investigation is complete. Yet this is the action that the 
first prong of the injunction disallows.  
The balance of harms and public interest inquiry tips sharply in favor of the 
Attorney General. On one side of the ledger, the Attorney General has sought only 
information as to whether Google’s actions violate consumer protection laws. On 
the other side, the federal court expressly has permitted potentially unlawful 
activity to go undetected by enjoining the Attorney General from both 
investigating and filing a future lawsuit against Google, if ever warranted.  Such an 
injunction is an unprecedented and drastic measure, and, while it certainly benefits 
Google’s interests, it does not serve the interests of the public. 
ARGUMENT 
The preliminary injunction four-factor test is familiar. See Affiliated Prof’l 
Home Health Care v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 1999). When that test is 
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examined in the context of the district court’s injunction, the errors are manifest 
and dispositive. 
I. Standard of Review Governing this Preliminary Injunction.  
The standard of review to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is abuse of 
discretion. “This discretion, however, is not unbridled, and a preliminary 
injunction must be the product of reasoned application of the four factors held to 
be necessary prerequisites.” Enterprise International, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal 
Petrolera Equatoriana, 762 F.2d 464, 472 (5th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted). “[I]f 
the movant does not succeed in carrying its burden on any one of the four 
prerequisites, a preliminary injunction . . . will be vacated on appeal.” Id. 
The legal principles upon which any preliminary injunction decision is 
grounded are reviewed de novo. Woman’s Med. Ctr v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 419 (5th 
Cir. 2001).  This includes questions of subject matter jurisdiction, and “whether the 
elements for Younger abstention are present.” Borden v. Allstate Insurance Co., 
589 F.3d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 2009); Gibson v. Orleans Parish, No. 13-30944, 2014 
WL 1066987, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 20, 2014). 
II. The District Court Erred in Enjoining the Attorney General from 
Seeking to Enforce the Subpoena. 
A. The Attorney General’s Authority to Investigate.  
 
The Attorney General, like all Attorneys General, is the chief law 
enforcement officer in the State. Married to this position is the paramount duty to 
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investigate potential violations of state laws, including violations of the MCPA.  In 
carrying out the duty to investigate, administrative subpoenas, also referred to as 
civil investigative demands (“CIDs”), are a valuable and necessary tool. And they 
certainly are not unique to the State of Mississippi.
2
  
The subpoena here was issued pursuant to Mississippi Code § 75-24-27. 
Such subpoenas are not self-executing. The Attorney General cannot unilaterally 
compel compliance; he only can initiate an enforcement proceeding in state court. 
At that point, the subject of the subpoena is provided notice, a hearing, and an 
opportunity to present to the state court any objections to the subpoena. Id. These 
state-court procedures are the ones from which Google has recoiled and, worse, the 
lower court has enjoined. 
B. Google Failed to Demonstrate Irreparable Harm.   
Google has yet to urge any legitimate argument as to how litigation of its 
defenses in state court could amount to irreparable harm. And the district court 
failed to even consider the same consequences. Instead, the district court relied on 
the First Amendment alone to find irreparable harm. ROA.2105-1206.  
While the Attorney General does not dispute that the loss of First 
Amendment rights can play an important role in the examination, Google’s efforts 
to hide behind the First Amendment do not hold up. Google never once contends 
                                                 
 
2
 ROA.1964-1978. 
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that producing the documents requested in the subpoena would run afoul of the 
First Amendment, so as to cause irreparable harm. Google, in fact, could not argue 
this. The company “voluntarily” provided some information in response to the 
subpoena (i.e., partially complied), it compiles many similar documents for its own 
Transparency Report, and it publically provided documents to the court in support 
of its preliminary injunction motion. ROA.95; 1406; 1417. Google also never 
suggests how asking the state court to quash the subpoena could cause irreparable 
harm, and Google never contends that the provision of the law on which the 
subpoena was issued limits speech. 
Tellingly, Google concedes that the subpoena could be narrowed and that 
the Attorney General can seek facts as to whether federal law immunizes Google’s 
conduct. ROA.1543. (“Should the Court enjoin enforcement of the Subpoena, the 
Attorney General is of course free to develop a narrow subpoena that does not 
focus on activity immunized under the CDA.”); ROA.54. (“Google asked that the 
Subpoena be withdrawn or at least limited to activity not immunized by Section 
230 of the CDA.”); ROA.95. (“A subpoena limited to seeking the facts necessary 
to determine whether immunity exists would be a different matter.”).  At issue 
here, therefore, is the purported scope of the subpoena, and that Google thinks it 
may have a First Amendment defense if a lawsuit ever is filed. 
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At this investigatory juncture, the Attorney General cannot compel Google 
to produce documents or force Google to change its business operations. In an 
effort to defeat Younger, in fact, Google avowed that it thought the subpoena 
“neither declared nor enforced any liability.” ROA.1534. Google’s irreparable 
harm argument thus rings hollow. The company, at bottom, does not want to 
litigate in state court in Mississippi, and it does not want to respond to the 
subpoena because it purportedly “would have to produce millions of documents.” 
ROA.91. Neither of these contentions establishes irreparable harm, and the latter 
argument only is one for narrowing the subpoena, not enjoining the investigation.
3
  
More importantly, in finding that irreparable harm would result from the 
Attorney General asking the state court to enforce the subpoena, the district court 
had to deduce, with no basis, that the state court would act unconstitutionally. This 
presumption of potential wrong doing on the part of the state court is a direct 
affront to the Supreme Court’s repeated affirmation “of the constitutional 
obligation of the state courts to uphold federal law, and [our] expression of 
confidence in their ability to do so.” Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 
U.S. 261, 275 (1997). 
                                                 
  
3
 A litany of cases support this proposition: American Radio v. Mobile S.S. Ass’n, 483 
F.2d 1, 5 (1973) (danger only would arise “if we equate danger with the litigation of one’s claim 
in the Alabama state courts”); O’Keefe v. Chisolm, 769 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2014); Canal 
Auth., 489 F.2d at 575; Enter. Int’l, Inc. v. Corporacion Estatal Petrolera Ecuatoriana, 762 F.2d 
464, 474 (5th Cir. 1985) (the “time and energy necessarily expended” without an injunction “are 
not enough”). 
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In the main, Google’s preliminary injunction motion is a paradigmatic 
example of both forum shopping and procedural fencing. Google’s goal is to win a 
“race to judgment” by having the federal court ignore the principles of federalism 
and comity.  Even in the absence of abstention being appropriate from a doctrinal 
standpoint, it is perverse to short circuit, through a wholesale federal injunction, 
state court procedures and express doubts in the confidence of the state courts to 
uphold federal law. There are valid and constitutionally unchallenged channels in 
state court for narrowing or quashing the subpoena.  From this, Google has an 
adequate remedy at law—Google just does not like the forum in which it is 
available.  
 C. Google Failed to Demonstrate a Likelihood of Success.   
The district court’s “all or nothing” injunction misses the mark. Google 
clutters the record with anticipatory defenses and references to the future lawsuit it 
thinks the Attorney General might file.  But injunction one has prohibited the 
Attorney General from asking a state court to enforce an administrative subpoena.   
Precisely none of Google’s claims serve to prohibit that.  Indeed, even when 
Google’s “claims,” such as the CDA, properly are asserted as defenses in the 
context of a lawsuit, the litigated issues require a “fact-intensive” inquiry that often 
cannot be resolved until after discovery. An administrative subpoena is one giant 
step removed from that.  
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Significantly, too, by transforming its defenses into claims, Google has 
brought the “fight” to the doorstep of the court. In doing so, the company will be 
required to factually (and legally) prove each one of its claims, including its 
entitlement to immunity. There is thus no legal basis for Google to say that its 
claims prohibit the Attorney General from investigating those same claims, asking 
a state court to enforce the subpoena, or prohibit Google from altogether producing 
documents. 
An examination of Google’s actions confirms the host of errors in the 
granted injunction.  Google’s so-called causes of action break down into four 
categories: (i) immunity under the CDA; (ii) the First Amendment; (iii) federal 
preemption; and (iv) the Fourth Amendment. Each is discussed in turn. 
i. The Communications Decency Act.  
Because there has been no lawsuit filed, the question to be asked is not the 
purely academic one of whether Google may be entitled to a CDA defense if a 
cause of action is filed in the future. The question is whether the CDA outright 
shields Google from an investigation and prohibits the Attorney General from even 
asking a state court to enforce an administrative subpoena. The answer to this 
question is undisputed: it does not.  
Even if this case was one more step down the litigation line, the CDA does 
not prohibit the filing of a lawsuit against Google, as many have been filed before. 
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Many also have proceeded to discovery. In fact, Google has before asserted its 
CDA immunity defense at the motion to dismiss stage, and Google has before lost 
on that front. This includes losing on claims urged pursuant to state law.  See, e.g., 
CYBERsitter v. Google, 905 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Perfect 10 v. 
Google, 2008 WL 4217837, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 16, 2008).  
For this reason, Google’s retreat from Rule 12(b)(6) in favor of seeking 
refuge in Rules 8 and 65 is improper. Those latter rules, neither alone nor in 
conjunction, provide an escape hatch to prevent an investigation into the 
company’s actions. Indeed, Rules 65 and 12(b)(6) are, to some extent, opposite 
sides of the same coin. If you lose at Rule 12(b)(6) because of immunity questions 
of fact in the context of a lawsuit, you certainly should not win a blanket injunction 
as a matter of law in the context of an initial investigation. 
  In attempting to override this simple fact, Google superficially brands CDA 
immunity as a “one size fits all” legal weapon. Such a myopic reading of the law, 
however, quickly may be discarded. Immunity under the CDA is much like other 
types of immunity, including qualified immunity. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. 
Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 254-55 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Section 230 
immunity, like other forms of immunity, is generally accorded effect at the first 
logical point in the litigation process. As we have often explained in the qualified 
immunity context, immunity is an immunity from suit . . . .”). It is true that courts 
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have interpreted § 230 of the CDA to protect services providers, including Google, 
in certain circumstances. Those circumstances, however, are when the CDA is 
asserted as a defense to a lawsuit. Even then, those circumstances are fact specific 
and dependent on the nature of the claim asserted, as is the case with all immunity.  
 The CDA’s provisions help illustrate the problems with Google’s argument. 
The CDA reads, in part: “No provider or user of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The statute goes on to define 
“information content provider” as “any . . . entity that is responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development of information provided through the Internet 
or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).  By its very 
terms, however, the statute preserves a number of potential claims. See 47 U.S.C. § 
230(e). This includes claims brought under state law, see 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3), 
and a number of distinct immunity exceptions. 
First, the CDA provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to 
limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.” § 230(e)(2). This 
provision has been treated as a carve-out from CDA immunity for both federal and 
state law intellectual property claims. Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Project Playlist, 
Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 690 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Universal Comm. Sys. C. Lycos, Inc., 
478 F.3d 413 (1st Cir. 2007); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. For Civil Rights Under 
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Law, Inc., 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008). The Attorney General’s subpoena 
requested information related to exception number one. ROA.1287-1290; 1097-
1175. 
Second, the CDA does not extend immunity to a defendant for its own acts 
of fraud or misconduct. See, e.g., CYBERsitter, LLC v. Google, Inc., 905 F. Supp. 
2d 1080, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 
1263 (N.D. Cal. 2006). The subpoena additionally requested information related to 
exception number two. ROA.1287-1290; 1097-1175. 
Third, the CDA does not immunize Google for its own participation in 
developing illegal conduct. See § 230(f)(3); Fair Housing Council v. 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162-68 (9th Cir. 2008); FTC v. Accusearch, 
Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009). The subpoena also requested 
information related to exception number three. ROA.1287-1290; 1097-1175. 
In general, on these latter exceptions, Google is right in that § 230 of the 
CDA immunizes it from its passive display as a “publisher” of content created by 
third parties. Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that § 
230(c)(1) bars claims against web-based service providers “stemming from their 
publication of information created by third parties”). But that is where it ends. 
Section 230’s protections apply only if the interactive computer service is not itself 
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an information content provider. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1162-68; Accusearch, 
Inc., 570 F.3d at 1191.  
Without hesitation, courts have reasoned that the terms “interactive 
computer service provider” and “information content provider” are not mutually 
exclusive. That is, “[i]t is not inconsistent” for a particular entity “to be an 
interactive service provider and also an information content provider.” Anthony, 
421 F. Supp. 2d at 1263. Where a search engine is “much more than a passive 
transmitter of information by others,” and instead “becomes the developer, at least 
in part, of that information,” § 230 affords no protection. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 
1166; Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Dirty 
World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 410 (6th Cir. 2014). 
Despite these marked exceptions to CDA immunity, the lower court issued 
an unrelenting injunction that suspends Younger and warps federal law, so as to 
insulate the company from any state investigation. The injunction, in this regard, 
judicially generates a level of immunity not offered by Congress. The inunction 
also is premised on circular logic. The point of the (or any) investigation was to 
unearth the facts necessary to determine whether the CDA’s grant of immunity 
applies in the first instance. More to the point, the Attorney General’s investigation 
was designed to determine the precise nature of Google’s role and whether the 
company’s conduct crosses the line between immunized and actionable.  
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Google is not blind to this, as the company has been investigated before—
most recently, by the Department of Justice. If that investigation had been 
suppressed prematurely, there would not have been a $500 million dollar 
settlement reached. A settlement and an investigation that, much like the Attorney 
General’s, sought to vindicate public interest concerns. Under the lower court’s 
rationale, that investigation and settlement should not have happened.  
The granted injunction signals that Attorneys General (and others) judicially 
will be forced to accept, at face value, Google’s own version of the untested facts, 
including whether the company’s conduct is violative of state law and not 
immunized by federal law. The injunction, in this regard, incorrectly ratifies 
Google’s “trust us” litigation tactic, a ploy courts rightfully have refused to endorse 
even in the lawsuit context. See Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 2008 WL 4217837, at 
*8 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 16, 2008) (rejecting the argument that it was “common 
knowledge that Google is not a content provider” and noting that the “question of 
whether any of Google’s conduct disqualifies it for immunity under the CDA will 
undoubtedly be fact-intensive”); see also Hare v. Richie, No. ELH-11-3488, 2012 
WL 3773116, at *1, *19 (D. Md. Aug. 29, 2012) (allowing “the creation of factual 
record” so that the court could determine whether the website “encourages 
development” of offensive content “submitted by third parties . . . so as to lose the 
protection of § 230(c)(1) for user-submitted content by participating in the 
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content’s development”); Demetraides v. Yelp, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131, 145 (Cal. 
App. 2014) (“Nowhere does plaintiff seek to enjoin or hold Yelp liable for the 
statements of third parties . . . Rather, plaintiff seeks to hold Yelp liable for its own 
statements regarding the accuracy of its filter.”). 
In many cases, including cases where Google ended up on the other side of a 
lawsuit, dismissal was not proper prior to federal discovery. Under the district 
court’s ruling though, the Attorney General cannot even investigate Google’s 
conduct, let alone formulate a claim or get to discovery. And this is despite the fact 
that the Attorney General explicitly has informed Google that “it is not being 
investigated or pursued for the conduct of others.” ROA.647.4   
In short, the injunction is a perilous game changer.  It judicially transforms 
what has been likened, even by Google, to qualified immunity from suit into 
unqualified immunity from state law (and state court).  
ii. The First Amendment.  
The Attorney General fully accepts that Google’s advertising practices can 
implicate First Amendment considerations. Google’s and the district court’s 
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 Oddly, the district court relied on a letter from over forty Attorneys General to 
Congress regarding the scope of the CDA to find a likelihood of success. ROA.2101. That letter, 
however, concerns “prostitution” and “crimes against children.” ROA.609-613.  
The district court reasoned that the letter revealed that the Attorney General knows the 
scope of the CDA. ROA.2101. In this regard, the district court was right. The Attorney General 
does understand the CDA. As he stated at the NAAG’s summer meeting, he and many other 
Attorneys General simply think that Google is “stepping over the line out of [the CDA’s] 
protections.” ROA.405.   
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expansive reading of the First Amendment, however, impairs—and, in fact, 
obstructs—any authorized investigation when the conduct being investigated 
encompasses the use of an internet service. Such a scopic interpretation of federal 
law goes too far.  
Less than five years ago, the First Amendment did not preclude federal and 
state authorities from investigating online drug sales by entities that used Google’s 
services. Nor did it stop Google from entering into a Non-Prosecution Agreement. 
ROA.1176-1192. Moreover, that same investigation raised other serious legal and 
factual questions, such as whether Google helped others circumvent the law. These 
types of questions are the ones on which the Attorney General’s investigation 
seeks answers. 
In its complaint, Google neither challenged the Attorney General’s authority 
to issue the subpoena nor the regulation under which it was issued. Google never 
claims that the MCPA is facially unconstitutional, and the company identifies no 
case in which a court has found that MCPA enforcement violated constitutional 
rights.
5
 To the contrary, Google merely asserts that the “Attorney General’s 
Inquiry against Google constitutes the exercise of prosecutorial and/or civil 
regulatory authority under color of state law.” ROA.59.  
                                                 
 
5
 The MCPA has been applied in several instances. ROA.1322.  
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This argument proves too much. This Circuit, as well as the Supreme Court, 
repeatedly has stressed the importance of a “sufficiently specific record,” 
“[p]articularized facts,” and a full factual context when assessing the 
constitutionality of a regulation of speech. See, e.g., Turner Broad Sys. v. FCC, 
512 U.S. 622, 668 (1994); Justice v. Hosemann, 771 F.3d 285, 292-94 (5th Cir. 
2014); In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410, 434 (5th Cir. 2010); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 
514, 524 (2001); City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 
488, 495-96 (1986). “[I]n cases raising First Amendment issues,” the Court has 
recognized the need “to make an independent examination of the entire record.” 
Bose Corp. v. Consumeres Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984).  
The grant of Google’s preliminary injunction has prevented the State from 
amassing the factual record that would be necessary to evaluate Google’s First 
Amendment claim, including whether any of the possible exceptions to it apply.   
Indeed, even Google appears to acknowledge that it would not altogether be 
shielded by the First Amendment if it were participating in unlawful or criminal 
activity.  And Google concedes that it complies with a number of subpoenas and 
even search warrants each year. ROA.1406; 1417. 
In the same vein, Google readily acknowledges that the Attorney General 
properly may inquire on the issue of federal immunity, including through the 
issuance of a subpoena. For instance, Google acknowledges, albeit 
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paternalistically, as follows: “A subpoena limited to seeking the facts necessary to 
determine whether immunity exists would be a different matter.” ROA.95. Google, 
of course, wants to be the sole arbiter of those “necessary” facts. But, even with 
this, it is clear that even Google accepts that the First Amendment does not 
remotely insulate the company from complying with an investigation into potential 
illegal activities—including the State of Mississippi’s.  
Google’s so-called investigatory retaliation claim also cannot get it a federal 
injunction at the stage in which the State’s investigation is in its infancy.  Both 
Google and the district court turned to Izen v. Catalina, 398 F.3d 363, 367 (5th Cir. 
2005) for the analysis of the retaliatory investigation claim. ROA.101; 1550; 2102. 
Izen’s principles, however, do not fit this mold.  
The retaliation challenge in Izen was made after a criminal prosecution, not 
before the investigation could begin. Id. On the First Amendment claim, this 
Circuit held that, in the “prosecution context,” plaintiffs “must establish each of the 
common law malicious prosecution elements in addition to those three derived 
from the First Amendment . . . One of these standards is an absence of probable 
cause to prosecute.”6 Id.  
                                                 
    
6
 Probable cause is not required for administrative subpoenas, as discussed infra. Also, 
another element of malicious prosecution is termination of the state proceedings in the plaintiff’s 
favor. Pardue v. Jackson Cnty., Miss., No. 1:14-CV-290-KS-MTP, 2015 WL 1867145 (S.D. 
Miss. Apr. 23, 2015). 
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The expressed reason for why the elements of malicious prosecution must be 
demonstrated was that “[a]n individual does not have a right under the First 
Amendment to be free from a criminal prosecution supported by probable cause . . 
.” Id. at 368 (citing Mozzochi v. Borden, 959 F.2d 1174, 1180 (2d Cir. 1992); Allen 
v. McClelland, No. H–13–1416, 2015 WL 1968908, at *9 (S.D. Tex. April 28, 
2015) (“[T]he First Amendment does not protect individuals from arrests 
supported by probable cause, even if the motivation is retaliation. Where there is 
grounds to charge criminal conduct, the objectives of law enforcement take 
primacy over the citizen’s right to avoid retaliation.”).7  
In relying on Izen not only to declare its rights but also to halt an 
investigation before it even may begin, Google has capsized the case’s analysis and 
perverted its teachings. The only way the Attorney General truly and fairly even 
can attempt to defend Google’s retaliatory investigation claim would be for the 
Attorney General to preemptively reveal law enforcement investigatory theories 
and/or files—at the inception of the (halted) investigation and on a completely 
undeveloped factual record at that.
8
  With due respect, this is a radical 
proposition—even for Google. 
                                                 
  
7
 Younger, 401 U.S. at 51 (“Moreover, the existence of a ‘chilling effect,’ even in the 
area of First Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for 
prohibiting state action.”). 
 
8
 Unlike in Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1387 (5th Cir. 1979), where the court 
evaluated Younger’s bad faith exception, there has been no prosecution initiated by the Attorney 
General against Google. See id. Yet, the Attorney General has demonstrated that the subpoena 
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What’s more is that many courts have questioned whether an investigation 
even gives rise to a First Amendment action. The Supreme Court in Hartman v. 
Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) mentioned—but pointedly did not resolve—the issue.  
547 U.S. at 262 n.9 (“No one here claims that simply conducting a retaliatory 
investigation with a view to promote a prosecution is a constitutional tort . . .”).  
After Hartman, courts have determined that a retaliatory investigation does not 
“form the basis of a constitutional claim.” See, e.g., Trueman v. United States, No. 
7:12-CV-73-F, 2015 WL 1456134, at *13 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 2015).
9
 
The query before this Court not only is whether Google prematurely can 
seek to declare its rights, it is whether the injunction was proper.  Notably, out of 
all of the First Amendment cases cited by Google, even those with drastic and 
inapposite factual scenarios, not in a single one was an injunction halting a state 
investigation at its inception granted. ROA.101-103; 1548-1549. That alone 
underscores the radical nature of the district court’s decision.  
Google’s heavy reliance on Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 910-
17, 922 (9th Cir. 2002) is instructive.  While Google reduces Lacey to a claim 
                                                                                                                                                             
was likely to produce information directly relevant to whether Google is in violation of the 
MCPA. 
 
9
 See, e.g., Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 850 n. 24 (11th Cir. 2010); Yazid–Mazin v. 
McCormick, 2013 WL 5758716, at *4 n. 5 (D.N.J. Oct. 24, 2013); Roark v. United States, 2013 
WL 1071778, at *5 (D. Or. Mar. 12, 2013); Colson v. Grohman, 174 F.3d 498 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(noting in dicta that even had the County Attorney’s Office initiated an investigation, this would 
not be actionable).  
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about retaliatory investigation, that is not at all what Lacey was about. In Lacey, 
unlawful arrests were made, contempt motions were filed, a newspaper was asked 
to reveal its sources, and a criminal prosecution was initiated and dismissed. Id. In 
addition, the Sheriff had “pressured county attorneys in Maricopa and Pinal 
counties to prosecute, even after attorneys in both counties concluded there was no 
case.” Id. The county also had issued several grand jury subpoenas to a newspaper, 
but the claim was brought after a state court had “declared” the subpoenas 
“invalid.” Id. at 910-912. Lacey does not offer Google a lifeline to an injunction, 
and neither do the remaining cited cases.
10
  
Unless the First Amendment is an absolute bar to any government 
investigation into conduct in any way related to Google’s search and advertising 
functions—which no court ever has suggested and cannot be the law—the 
Attorney General has offended no constitutional right by asking for some 
information related to those functions that may violate state consumer protection 
laws. 
                                                 
 
10
 See, e.g., Pendleton v. St. Louis Cnty., 178 F.3d 1007, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999) (Appeal 
was at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage and allegations were that defendants “fabricated a criminal 
investigation in furtherance of a conspiracy.” The claim survived a motion to dismiss, but no 
injunction was granted.); Little v. City of N. Miami, 805 F.2d 962, 968 (11th Cir. 1986) (Appeal 
was at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage and allegations were that the defendant “adopted . . . official 
resolution publically censuring appellant in retaliation for appellant’s representation of an 
adverse party in state litigation . . .” The claim survived a motion to dismiss, but no injunction 
was granted); White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1228 (9th Cir. 2000) (No injunction granted halting 
the investigation where “HUD officials [among other things] carried out an investigation that 
lasted more than eight months” when the law set a “presumptive 100–day time limit”). 
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iii. Federal Preemption.  
Google’s preemption defenses are brought under the Copyright Act and the 
FDCA. All parties agree that federal law, in certain circumstances, can preempt 
state law, but no cause of action has been brought at this juncture. In this regard, 
saying that Google put the proverbial cart before the horse would be to put it 
mildly. To reach Google’s preemption conclusion, the Court must either: (a) 
determine that federal law altogether preempts any state investigation, or (b) must 
theorize what the investigation will reveal, whether a suit will be filed, what the 
suit will allege, and whether Google will be able to establish a preemption defense. 
No court ever has suggested the former in these circumstances, and the latter forces 
this Court to work in hypotheticals. 
The latter also compels the Attorney General to manufacture the “claim” he 
might file, and then also demonstrate how that suppositious claim is not preempted. 
While this might be intellectually seductive, it transmutes ordinary preemption 
defenses into forced offensive pre-litigation.  The lower court’s opinion especially 
is illustrative of why such an analysis is inapt.  
The district court, for instance, reasoned that “[w]ith very limited 
exceptions, actions brought for violations of the FDCA are exclusively within the 
purview of the federal government.” ROA.2104. The court also peculiarly 
explained that it is “well-established that state attorneys lack the authority to 
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enforce the Copyright Act.” ROA.2103. From this reasoning, the district court 
leaped to the impossible conclusion that such laws “preempt[ ] much of the 
Attorney General’s investigation.” ROA.2104.  
Such a rationale presupposes both that the Attorney General is trying to 
enforce the Copyright Act, and that the Attorney General has or even will bring an 
“action[ ]” for “violations of the FDCA.”  Yet, the Attorney General is not even 
close to that point, as he only has requested information. The decision also 
recognizes the lack of complete preemption while, at the same time, incorrectly 
equating causes of “actions” to an “investigation,” something courts have refused 
to do. In fact, on this point, Google’s best but unavailing authority is instructive.  
In Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2003), the 
Eleventh Circuit prohibited attorney general administrative subpoenas because the 
“business of baseball” is exempt from all state and federal antitrust laws. Id. at 
1183-86. Even with the across-the-board exemption at issue in Crist, the court 
expressly declined to halt the investigation on preemption grounds. Id. at 1186. 
Google’s own case citations thus are self-defeating of its preemption claims. 
A related problem for Google is that it cannot demonstrate that the same 
categorical exemption that existed in Crist is at play in this litigation. For instance, 
under the “extra element” test applied by this Circuit, a right under state law is not 
“equivalent” to any of the rights in the scope of federal copyright law, and there is 
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no preemption if “one or more qualitatively different elements are required to 
constitute the state-created cause of action.” Computer Mgmt. Asst. Co. v. Robert 
F. DeCastro, Inc., 220 F.3d 396, 404 (5th Cir. 2000).  As noted in the lower court, 
the elements of certain potential state law claims do not overlap with federal 
copyright law. ROA.1293-1294. The same is true for arguments related to the 
FDCA.
11
  ROA.1296.   
Ultimately, even under Google’s flawed preemption analysis, the company 
did not (because it cannot) credibly suggest that the information sought by the 
subpoena could support only preempted claims, rather than any number of non-
preempted claims. A wholesale injunction thus was in error. 
iv. The Fourth Amendment.  
Just as state courts resolve disputes regarding state administrative 
subpoenas, federal courts routinely hear disputes regarding subpoenas issued by 
federal agencies.  Even should the federal court place itself as the first line of 
review for federal and state subpoenas, the Attorney General’s subpoena meets the 
“minimal” and “strictly limited” review conducted by federal courts of federal 
agency subpoenas. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209-10 
                                                 
 
11
 The safe harbor provision in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) also 
does not assure blanket immunity. And Google recognizes that the subpoena is not completely 
preempted. ROA.61. (“The Attorney General’s Inquiry, in so far as it pertains to possible 
copyright infringement or the importation of prescription drugs is preempted[.]”).  
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(1946);
12
 Sandsend Fin. Consultants, Ltd. v. FHLBB, 878 F.2d 875, 879 (5th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Chevron, 186 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 1999).  
For administrative subpoenas, the Supreme Court has refused to require that 
an agency have probable cause to justify the issuance of such. United States v. 
Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964). Administrative agencies have the “power of 
inquisition . . . analogous to the Grand Jury, which does not depend on a case or 
controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that 
the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.” 
United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642–43 (1950); United States v. 
Zadeh, No. 4:14-CV-106-O, 2015 WL 418098, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2015). 
Under this limited review, courts ask two questions: (1) “whether the 
investigation is for a proper statutory purpose and (2) whether the documents the 
agency seeks are relevant to the investigation.”13 One: the Attorney General’s 
statutory grounds for the issuing the subpoena are unchallenged. Two: the 
documents sought certainly are relevant to the investigation as to whether state law 
has been violated.
14
 
                                                 
 
12
 As stated in Oklahoma Press, “[w]hat [Google] seek[s] is not to prevent an unlawful 
search and seizure. It is rather a total immunity” from the law. 
 
13
 Sandsend, 877 F.2d at 879; See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967).  
 
14
 For “purposes of an administrative subpoena, the notion of relevancy is a broad one . . 
. So long as the material requested touches a matter under investigation, an administrative 
subpoena will survive a [relevancy] challenge.” Sandsend, 878 F.2d at 882. 
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While Google (again) relies on the Eleventh Circuit’s Crist case, that case 
(again) reveals precisely why the Fourth Amendment is not triggered in this 
instance. Crist’s holding is logical: “investigations premised solely upon legal 
activity are the very type of ‘fishing expeditions’ that run afoul of the Fourth 
Amendment.” Crist, 331 F.3d at 1187 (emphasis supplied). The Attorney General 
there had issued CIDs “based solely upon the Attorney General’s authority to 
investigate antitrust violations.” Id. at 1180 n.5. However, the conduct being 
investigated was per se legal—as the “business of baseball” enjoys categorical 
exemption from antitrust laws.   
No matter the outcome of the investigation in Crist, an antitrust claim could 
not be filed. In effect, then, there was no reason for the Attorney General to 
conduct any antitrust investigation and, for this reason, none of the documents 
sought remotely could be relevant. That is the narrow type of circumstance in 
which the Fourth Amendment has been summoned to review a state administrative 
subpoena. And that undisputedly is not this case, or even close to it. Google thus 
has no plausible relief on this claim, let alone a likelihood of success.  
D. The Balance of Harms Scales and Public Policy Tips Sharply 
Against an Injunction.  
A balancing of the equities tips heavily, if not completely, in favor of the 
State. The interests implicated from the Attorney General’s perspective are grave, 
and they include: (i) the Legislature’s intent and ability to set forth a statutory 
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framework for the protection of consumers; (ii) the Executive Branch’s authority, 
through the Attorney General, to investigate and prosecute (if necessary) either 
civil or criminal violations of the State’s consumer protection laws; and (3) the 
State’s judiciary’s right and obligation to be the first line of defense in interpreting, 
applying, and enforcing the laws of the State.  
On the other side of the scale, Google offers little, aside from guised 
attempts at forum shopping. Google never has suggested that the subpoena, in toto, 
requests information potentially protected by federal law. And Google never has 
suggested how making the same arguments in state court could amount to 
irreparable harm.  In fact, if there actually is anything to Google’s insistent 
defenses, the company readily could assert them in state court to get the subpoena 
quashed.  
The end result of the granted injunction tips the scales even more. While the 
Attorney General’s statutorily-authorized investigation has been halted in its 
infancy, Google’s investigation into the Attorney General’s investigation is 
ongoing. ROA.2212-2214. In the name of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Google is getting a preview into why it was being investigated in the first instance. 
Such a precedent not only sets a dangerous roadmap for future potential offenders, 
but allowing the injunction to stand would amount to a draconian usurpation of the 
State’s sovereignty. 
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E. Alternatively, and Additionally, Younger Abstention is Required. 
Google’s request for relief strikes at the heart of Younger abstention.15 
Younger’s three-part test is well-established and satisfied here. Wightman v. Texas 
Supreme Court, 84 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1996); ROA.1278-1284. First, Google does 
not seriously argue that it does not have an adequate opportunity for judicial 
review in state court, as it can, among other things, file a motion to quash the 
subpoena. See, e.g., DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1984). 
Second, compelling state interests are implicated. The enforcement of 
subpoenas issued pursuant to valid state statutory authority that only is enforceable 
in state court is an important state interest, especially given the consumer 
protection statutes under which the subpoena was issued. See, e.g., Cuomo v. 
Dreamland Amusements, Inc., 2008 WL 4369270, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2008). 
Third, there is an ongoing proceeding. While there currently is no filed 
lawsuit, this Circuit has recognized that “Younger’s applicability has been 
expanded to include certain kinds of civil and even administrative proceedings that 
are judicial in nature.” Texas Assoc. of Business v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 520 (5th 
Cir. 2004). As explained in J. & W. Selieman & Co. v. Spitzer, No. 05 Civ. 7781, 
2007 WL 2822208 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007), it long has been established that “the 
                                                 
 
15
 See, e.g., Rio Grande Cmty. Health Ctr., Inc. v. Rullan, 397 F.3d 56, 68 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(standard of review for Younger in a preliminary injunction appeal).   
      Case: 15-60205      Document: 00513088659     Page: 52     Date Filed: 06/22/2015
38 
 
issuance of compulsory process, including subpoenas, in criminal cases, initiates 
an ‘ongoing’ proceeding for the purposes of Younger abstention.” Id. at **15-16.  
The logic of such decisions mandates the same conclusion in the civil 
enforcement context: 
[t]he reasoning supporting these decisions applies with similar force 
to the contested [investigatory administrative] subpoenas. Although 
the contested subpoenas are not part of a criminal proceeding, they 
were issued by the Attorney General pursuant to an investigation of 
Plaintiffs’ allegedly illegal activities…Younger’s principles extend to 
civil and administrative proceedings…They are an ‘integral part’ of a 
potential proceeding against Plaintiffs, and without such subpoenas, 
the Attorney General ‘seldom could amass the evidence necessary’ to 
commence fraud actions. 
 
Id. at *5 (internal citations omitted).
16
  
 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 
S. Ct. 584, 588 (2013) does not change this. The Supreme Court there “clarif[ied] 
and affirm[ed] that Younger extends to the three ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
identified in NOPSI, but no further.” Id. at 593–94. Here, it is NOPSI and its 
                                                 
   
16
 MPHJ Tech. Investments, LLC v. Sorrell, No. 2:14-CV-191, 2015 WL 3505224, at *3 
(D. Vt. June 3, 2015); Cuomo, 2008 WL 4369270; Mir v. Shah, 2012 WL 6097770, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2012) aff’d, 569 F. App’x 48 (2d Cir. 2014); Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 12177, 
1182 (8th Cir. 1981); Empower Texans, Inc. v. Texas Ethics Comm’n, 2014 WL 1666389 (W.D. 
Tex. 2014); Iglecia v. Serrano, 882 F. Supp. 26, 29 (D.P.R. 1995); In re: Subpoena Duces 
Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 348 (4th Cir. 2000) (subpoena issued by an attorney general “commences 
an adversary process during which the person served with the subpoena may challenge it in court 
before complying with its demands.  As judicial process is afforded before any intrusion occurs, 
the proposed intrusion is regulated by, and its justification derives from, that process”). 
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progeny that lend support to abstention. Indeed, NOPSI’s second “circumstance” 
was civil enforcement proceedings. Id. at 584.  
In NOPSI, the Court said that, “[w]hile we have expanded Younger beyond 
criminal proceedings, and even beyond proceedings in courts, we have never 
extended to proceedings that are not ‘judicial in nature.”‘ NOPSI v. Council of City 
of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 369-71 (1989). “[J]udicial in nature means a state 
process that investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present 
or past facts under laws supposed to already exist.” Id. (emphasis supplied). 
Under the MCPA, the Attorney General may “issue cease and desist orders 
to persons suspected of violating any provision” of the consumer protection law, § 
75-24-27(b); “conduct hearings in aid of any investigation or inquiry;” and “enter 
into an assurance of voluntary compliance or an assurance of voluntary 
discontinuance with any person for settlement purposes.” § 75-24-27(1)(d), (g). As 
part of the MCPA’s statutory framework, the Attorney General also may “issue 
subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum,” § 75-24-17, as he did here. Under the 
“state process,” too, the subpoenas are enforced by a state court. This comports 
with the type of “judicial functions” in which this Circuit held meets the Younger 
test. Earle, 388 F.3d at 520. Sprint did not overrule Earle, and this matter falls 
within the category of proceedings recognized by NOPSI and affirmed by Sprint. 
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While Younger applies, its exceptionally rare “bad faith” exception does not. 
The lower court issued an unprecedented injunction after finding that there “may” 
be evidence of bad faith. ROA.2097. The court’s opinion, in this regard, both is 
misguided and unmoored from any accurate reading of the law.  
For example, the court reasoned: 
. . . the Attorney General made statements, on multiple occasions, 
which purport to show his intent to take legal action against Google 
for Google’s perceived violations. 
 
ROA.2097. This does not meet the narrow bad faith standard—or even get close to 
it. 
 The Supreme Court has emphasized that the bad faith exception provides a 
“very narrow gate for federal intervention in pending state [ ] proceedings.” Kugler 
v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975).  Indeed, “since Younger, no decision of the 
Supreme Court has found the bad faith exception applicable.” Motel 6 Operating, 
L.P. v. Gaston Cnty., N.C., No. 3:08-CV-00390-FDW, 2008 WL 4368478, at *4 
(W.D.N.C. Sept. 18, 2008); Kalniz v. Ohio State Dental Bd., 699 F. Supp. 2d 966, 
973-74 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
17
 Bad faith harassment “generally means that a 
prosecution has been brought without reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid 
                                                 
 
17
 “While the Supreme Court has not ruled out use of the bad faith exception in civil 
cases, see Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611, 95 S. Ct. 1200, it has never directly applied the exception in 
such a case, and we have only recognized it in the criminal context . . . Such an exception must 
be construed narrowly and only invoked in ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Tony Alamo 
Christian Ministries v. Selig, 664 F.3d 1245, 1254 (8th Cir. 2012). Cases like this underscore just 
how narrow the exception must be construed.  
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conviction.” Kugler, 421 U.S. at 121 n.6; Rucci v. Mahoning Cnty., No. 
4:11CV873, 2011 WL 5105812, at *7-8 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2011) (“bad faith 
prosecution exception is not available where the pending claims could be presented 
in state proceedings and there is no allegation of impermissible bias on the part of 
the state judiciary . . .”) (citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979)).  
Here, there has been no prosecution initiated; information pursuant to valid 
authority has been sought;
18
 Google may raise its claims in state court; and the 
Attorney General has deconstructed Google’s claims that the subpoena only seeks 
material for which Google enjoys some type of (future) federal immunity.  Issuing 
an administrative subpoena because there is reason to believe a company may be 
engaged in unlawful conduct does not constitute bad faith, and Younger mandates 
abstention.  
III. The District Court Erred in Enjoining the Attorney General from 
Brining Future and Hypothetical Civil or Criminal Charges.   
 The second-prong of the injunction is worse than the first. Or it is an 
advisory opinion that means nothing at all. It prohibits the Attorney General from 
“bringing a civil or criminal charge against Google under Mississippi law for 
                                                 
 
18
 DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1180 (5th Cir. 1984); Spitzer, 2007 WL 
2822208, at *7; Younger, 401 U.S. at 51; Rucci, 2011 WL 5105812, at *7-8 n. 4. 
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making accessible third-party content to Internet users.” ROA.2025.19  This cannot 
withstand appellate scrutiny.  
A. The Injunction Does Not Pass Muster Under Federal Rule 65.  
On its face, the injunction fails. The court’s injunction is not limited in time, 
and it bars the State’s top law enforcement official from ever bringing a lawsuit or 
a criminal charge against Google.  While Google attempts to staple the CDA’s 
third-party content protection to the injunction to make it appear narrow, it is not.   
At best, the court’s injunction simply is a restatement of federal immunity 
and thus an overbroad advisory opinion. At worst, the injunction is an insincere 
attempt on the part of Google to expand the CDA, so as to provide Google with a 
level of immunity that Congress has not offered. Either way, the injunction fails 
Rule 65’s threshold requirements.20  
The injunction first presumes that the Attorney General purposefully will 
file a lawsuit he knows he cannot win due to the CDA, something that the 
Attorney General expressly has disavowed. Even with this fallible presumption, 
though, safeguards, e.g., Rule 11, already are designed and built into the rules of 
procedure to deal with any such vexatious litigation.  
                                                 
 
19
 The injunction itself actually is even more imprecise: “The Attorney General will not 
be able to move on matters at issue herein, namely, the enforcement of the subpoena and the 
filing of charges against Google.” ROA.2107.  
 
20
 See FED. R. CIV. P. 65(d); Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473, 476 (1974); Seattle–First 
Nat. Bank v. Manges, 900 F.2d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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Second, the injunction fails because it presupposes, incorrectly, that the 
question of federal immunity never can be a question of fact. This is belied by the 
fact that Google and others have lost legal battles at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, since 
the question of whether the conduct is all third-party content or is otherwise 
immunized often is a “fact-intensive” inquiry.  
Third, the lower court’s injunction leaves the Attorney General open to a 
contempt proceeding should he ever file a lawsuit against Google –and lose. This 
absurd consequence begs a host of unanswerable questions: 
 If the Attorney General files a suit in state court, disagrees with Google on 
the issue of immunity, and wins at Rule 12(b)(6) but loses at trial, can the 
Attorney General, at that point, be held in contempt for violating the 
injunction?  
 
 Alternatively, what happens if the Attorney General wins the future 
lawsuit? Is the injunction void? Or is the injunction void if the Attorney 
General even can nudge a claim by a motion to dismiss?  
 
 Even worse, does the Attorney General have to file a declaratory 
judgment in federal court and “win” before a federal fact-finder on the 
fact issues of immunity before he is permitted to initiate a suit in state 
court?  
  
All of this is unknown, and all of it collides with the direct mandates of 
Federal Rule 65.  Plainly put, the relief provided in the injunction does not work, 
and Google’s attempt to shoehorn categorical immunity not offered by Congress 
into a judicial injunction is improper.   
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B. Google Cannot Demonstrate a Likelihood of Success.  
The likelihood of success arguments cannot be divorced from the relief 
provided. The “third-party content” portion of the injunction directly is married to 
the CDA’s immunity. To the extent it could be said to bear a tangential relationship 
to the Fourth Amendment or to preemption, those claims would fail for the same 
reasons already discussed.   
i. The Communications Decency Act.  
Through legislation, Congress could have offered Google and similar 
companies a blanket legal exemption, similar to that in Crist. It did not. Prohibiting 
an investigation and the filing of future “charges” judicially creates the level of 
immunity that Congress declined to afford. This is unwarranted. The injunction 
also is specious. It presumes to decide whether legal exceptions to immunity apply 
before any lawsuit may be filed (and before facts can be compiled), and it wrongly 
presupposes that immunity never can turn on a question of fact.  
The bottom line is that, here, the CDA offers Google a potential defense, if a 
lawsuit ever is brought. The CDA does not preclude the Attorney General from 
gathering facts to determine whether immunity applies; the CDA does not prohibit 
asking a state court to enforce a subpoena; and the CDA for sure does not offer 
Google an avenue for garnering a sweeping, anticipatory federal injunction to a 
state lawsuit not yet even framed. 
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ii. The First Amendment.   
Google also has maintained that the filing of a future lawsuit might infringe 
on or chill its First Amendment rights. For example, Google says it must “either 
conform its protected speech to the preferences of the Attorney General or face 
burdensome demands for information and risk civil or criminal prosecution.” 
ROA.1556. 
Such an argument, first, overlooks the third option Google seeks to discard: 
quashing the subpoena in state court. Second, in its complaint, Google did not 
point to any law that supposedly infringes on its speech. Cf Steffel v. Thompson, 
415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (“[I]t is not necessary that [a plaintiff] first expose 
himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he 
claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.”). 
Later, however, Google changed course. In a footnote, it argued that it is 
alleging “that applying the MCPA to bar Google from making available third party 
content to internet users violates the First Amendment . . . .” ROA.1529. Such a 
purported “as-applied” challenge is a non-starter. The MCPA has not yet been 
applied, much less applied to bar any conduct, and the subpoena does not focus on 
third-party content, but on whether Google’s own conduct is violative of state law.  
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In addition, such challenges are not opportunities to speculate,
21
 and the district 
court did not undertake a true as-applied analysis of the law.  
Also telling of the injunction’s legal shortfalls is the relief provided. The 
injunction endeavors to prohibit a lawsuit against Google “for making accessible 
third-party content to Internet users.”  This seems simple on the legal surface, but 
what lies beneath are the facts necessary to get there. To reach the relief afforded, 
one would have to deduce, in a factual vacuum, that the content all is information 
created by third parties, and that the Attorney General was investigating only third-
party content, which he undisputedly was not.  
Unless law enforcement always is required to rely solely on the word of the 
person or entity being investigated (e.g., Google’s self-serving affidavits), the 
question of whether the conduct is actionable or protected is only one that may be 
answered through an investigation. That is, one is required to “peek under the 
hood” to be able to engineer the legal result on a properly developed factual record. 
If Google is participating in unlawful or criminal activities, its conduct is neither 
categorically immunized nor altogether shielded by federal law. 
This is why the lower court’s injunction gets it wrong. Put simply, the facts 
necessary to adjudicate, or even assess, Google’s First Amendment protection 
                                                 
 
21
 Hosemann, 771 F.3d 285; In re Cao, 619 F.3d 410. 
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contentions remain to be investigated, and the factual record now is insufficient to 
determine whether any of the possible exceptions to such protection apply. 
C. There is No Irreparable Harm, and Google’s Claims of Such are 
Speculative. 
 
Prohibiting the filing of a future lawsuit presumes that an investigation is 
complete. But this is what injunction one disallows. At most, then, Google’s claim 
of irreparable harm amounts to one from a lawsuit that may or may not ever be 
filed.
22
  
On this, Google’s threat of harm argument is insincere.23 The so-called (and 
invented) threat of prosecution at the root of Google’s argument occurred in 
previous years, including 2013. ROA.397-398. For example, Google refers to 
comments that the Attorney General made on June 10, 2013. ROA.397-398. On 
that day, the Attorney General informed Google that it was being “investigat[ed]” 
and “[o]ne of the many potential outcomes of the ongoing investigation could be 
civil or criminal litigation arising under state law.” ROA.397.   
Of course, neither at that time nor any other time during the dialogue 
between Google and the Attorney General did Google rush to court to stop any 
urgent irreparable harm.  To the contrary, Google continuously told the Attorney 
                                                 
 
22
 Contra Bronx Household of Faith v. Board of Educ., 331 F.3d 342177 (2d Cir. June 6, 
2003 (“Where a plaintiff alleges injury from a rule or regulation that directly limits speech, the 
irreparable nature of the harm may be presumed.”).  
 
23
 Piscottano v. Murphy, 317 F. Supp. 2d 97, 102 (D. Conn. 2004) (“[P]laintiffs invoking 
the First Amendment do not always get a free pass on irreparable harm”). 
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General that it “wishes to continue our substantive engagement with you and other 
Attorneys General on the important issues raised in your letter” and that it 
“welcome[s] hearing about instances in which our services are being misused . . .” 
ROA.651.  Even in the two months after the issuance of the subpoena, Google did 
not exercise the legal options at its disposal (e.g., moving to quash), and this is 
despite its purported claims of urgent harm.  
Under correct legal standards, the company’s irreparable harm contentions 
do not fit.  Google’s own case citation reveals why.  Google cites to Morales v. 
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992), but the situation in Morales was 
different in a critical way. There, state attorneys general had issued guidelines to 
the airlines industry about unfair advertising practices and sent a letter to carriers 
making clear that their practices constituted a violation of state laws. Id. at 379.  
Indeed, the states’ express “purpose . . . [was] to clarify for the industry . . . that 
[the practice] is a violation of [ ] state law” and that they were sending a “formal 
notice of intent to sue.” Id.   
That is not this. Far from any “immediate threat” of harm, the Attorney 
General only now has requested information pursuant to his authority under state 
law—authority in which Google does not once challenge. Contra id. at 382. Even 
in Morales, the Supreme Court admonished the district court for “disregard[ing] 
the limits on the exercise of its injunctive power.” Id. at 382.  
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The injunction Google sought and received in this matter is the type of 
“blunderbuss injunction” that Morales counseled against. Id. Indeed, the injunction 
seeks to “determine the constitutionality of state laws in hypothetical situations 
where it is not even clear that the State itself would consider its laws applicable.” 
Id.  It is evident from the court’s grant of the injunction that Morales’s warning has 
gone unheeded. 
Overall, at this investigatory juncture, the Attorney General seeks only 
information—that only a state court can compel.  Google can respond to the 
subpoena, or it can choose not to and challenge it in state court. The company has 
many options, but a sweeping and indeterminate federal injunction cannot be one 
of them.  
D. The Balance of Harms and Public Interest Inquiry are Not Even 
Close. 
 
On injunction two, the preliminary injunction ledger is not near balanced. It 
prohibits the State of Mississippi from pursuing future “charges” against Google 
under state laws that are designed to protect against conduct that violates the public 
interest.  “[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes 
created by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury. New 
Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1351 (1977) (Rehnquist, 
J.).  
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It is a long-standing principle accepted in this nation’s history that the 
interests of a sovereign State in legislating, investigating, and potentially enforcing 
its own laws should not be judicially commandeered by a federal court lightly. But, 
that precisely is what has occurred here, and in the most untenable way: judicially 
suggesting that Google is immune from investigation, state law, and state court. 
Even in the absence of this matter falling within Younger’s domain, it was 
incorrect for the lower court to cast aside the profound notions of federalism, 
equity, and comity that underpin Younger. See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 n.22 (1983) 
(“[C]onsiderations of comity make us reluctant to snatch cases which a State has 
brought from the courts of that State, unless some clear rule demands it”).  
In the end, the court’s injunction goes not one, but two, steps too far. 
Enjoining the Attorney General from asking a state court to enforce the subpoena 
was a presumed misunderstanding of federal law, and prohibiting the filing of 
future “charges” was a gross misapplication of it.  
IV. Additionally, and Alternatively, Google’s Claims are Not Ripe and 
Defenses do not Confer Subject Matter Jurisdiction. 
i. Ripeness. 
As this case is still in the investigatory stages, it is not ripe for adjudication.  
The doctrine of ripeness, as a doctrine of justiciability, is “drawn from both Article 
III limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to 
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exercise jurisdiction.”  Reno v. Catholic Social Services, 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 
(1993); Orix Credit Alliance v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895-96 (5th Cir. 2000). 
Google asks this Court to speculate about claims the Attorney General may 
bring in the future based on its unilateral interpretation of the documents sought in 
the subpoena.  However, it is the Attorney General, and not Google, who is in the 
best position (and statutorily authorized) to determine what claims may be brought 
against Google under the MCPA, if any ever are brought at all.   
Obviously, the Attorney General cannot now ascertain the information the 
subpoena would elicit. If the subpoena were to reveal conduct that violates the 
MCPA and for which Google is not immunized, the Attorney General may then 
proceed under the MCPA. Texas Lawyers Ins. Exch. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 822 
F. Supp. 380, 385 (W.D. Tex. 1993). But we are not there yet. Compare Laird v. 
Tatum, 404 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (federal court jurisdiction not invoked by a party 
who alleges his rights are being “chilled by the mere existence without more, of a 
governmental investigative and data gathering activity that is alleged to be broader 
in scope than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of a valid 
governmental purpose”) with ROA.59 (“The Attorney General’s Inquiry is not the 
least restrictive means of accomplishing any compelling governmental purpose. . 
.”). 
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The Attorney General, at this juncture, only has requested information, and 
Google’s claims force the Court to assume that the Attorney General would bring 
an action that violates federal law. There is no basis, in either fact or law, for such 
an assumption.  Because much factual development of the case still remains, 
Google’s claims are not ripe—or, at a minimum, they do not warrant an injunction. 
ii. Federal Question Jurisdiction.   
The Attorney General recognizes that, normally, this jurisdictional argument 
would come at the very beginning of the analysis. In this instance, though, an 
initial examination of the nature of Google’s so-called claims sheds important light 
on the jurisdictional arguments. 
Google alleges that this case presents a “federal question” under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331. ROA.21. Federal question jurisdiction, however, “is not satisfied merely 
because the dispute is in some way connected with a federal matter.” Lowe v. 
Ingalls Shipbuilding, 723 F.2d 1173, 1178 (5th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); 
Wycoff Public Serv. Comm’n v. Wycoff, 344 U.S. at 248. Filing a suit using the 
Declaratory Judgment Act (“DJA”), as a procedural vehicle like Google did here, 
does not change this—or separately confer jurisdiction. Jolly v. United States of 
America, 488 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1974); Superior Oil Co. v. Pioneer Corp., 706 F.2d 
603, 605 (5th Cir. 1983)).  
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“[A]lthough the presence or absence of a federal question normally turns on 
an examination of the face of the plaintiff’s complaint, in an action for declaratory 
judgment the positions of the parties are reversed: the declaratory-judgment 
plaintiff would have been the defendant in the anticipated suit whose character 
determines the district court’s jurisdiction.” Rauner v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & 
Mun. Employees, No. 15 C 1235, 2015 WL 2385698, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 19, 
2015). As the Supreme Court stated, “if, but for the availability of the declaratory 
judgment procedure, the federal claim would arise only as a defense to a state 
created action, jurisdiction is lacking.” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 16 
(quotations removed); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-
72 (1950); Rauner, 2015 WL 2385698, at *2 (“[T]he existence of a federal defense 
is inadequate to confer jurisdiction . . . even if the constitutional defense is the only 
real issue in the case.”); Gaar v. Quirk, 86 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 1996).24   
Here, the “action” is an administrative subpoena issued under state law, and 
Google has asserted anticipatory preemption and CDA defenses. 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 According to Garr, there are only two exceptions to the rule concerning defenses to 
asserted state law claims:  (1) the artful pleading doctrine; and (2) when federal law completely 
preempts state law in that area. Gaar, 86 F.3d at 454 n.11. As in Garr, neither exception applies 
here. 
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iii. Lack of Jurisdiction over Google’s Defenses. 
Google’s preemption and immunity defenses do not create an independent 
jurisdictional basis.
25
  The starting point for this analysis is the case law on which 
Google and the district court relied.  One of Google’s chief case citations was to 
Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).  There, the Supreme Court stated 
a familiar rule: “[i]t is beyond dispute that federal courts have jurisdiction over 
suits to enjoin state officials from interfering with federal rights.”  
The Attorney General does not contend that federal courts cannot enjoin 
state officials under the appropriate circumstances. Cf. Okpalobi v. Foster 244 F.3d 
405, 416 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56). The 
relevant inquiry, though, is not whether federal courts can enjoin state officials, but 
when.  
In the lower court, Google’s retort to this argument was to offer footnote 14 
from the Shaw decision.  That footnote explains that federal jurisdiction is proper 
under § 1331 where a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from state regulation on 
grounds that such regulation is preempted by a federal statute. Shaw, 463 U.S. 85 
n.14. That is unhelpful for purposes of this analysis. Google does not contend that 
any state statute or regulation is preempted by federal law. Google, instead, argues 
                                                 
 
25
 The Attorney General acknowledges that Google urged a § 1983 action under the First 
and Fourth Amendments. Why there is no Fourth Amendment claim is discussed both supra and 
infra.  The Attorney General also acknowledges that courts in general have jurisdiction over 
First Amendment retaliation actions, but here that claim is not cognizable and certainly does not 
have a likelihood of success. 
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(incorrectly) that some of the information sought in the subpoena might be 
preempted depending on the claim the Attorney General might file in the future. 
Shaw’s holding simply is not that elastic.  
Google also attempted to find jurisdictional traction in the cases of Morales 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) and Cuomo v. Clearing House 
Ass’n, LLC, 557 U.S. 519 (2009). Those cases do not provide Google with an 
avenue to Article III.  In Morales, the National Association of Attorneys General 
adopted travel enforcement guidelines after federal deregulation of the airlines. Id. 
at 379. Thereafter, several attorneys general directed airlines to bring fare 
advertisements in line with those NAAG guidelines. Id.  
The federal deregulation statute at issue in Morales expressly prohibited 
states from regulating rates and fares and concluded “[s]tate enforcement actions 
having a connection with or reference to airline ‘rates, routes, or services, are pre-
empted under 49 U.S.C. App. § 1305(a)(1).” Id. at 384. Unlike the published 
guidelines in Morales, which expressly were preempted by federal law, Google 
tries to extrapolate putative claims from the contents of the subpoena to then argue 
the Copyright Act and/or the FDCA preempts the subpoena.  
Likewise, Google’s citation to Cuomo does not rework the proper 
jurisdictional outcome. There, the Attorney General of New York sought 
documents from national banks. The defendant moved to enjoin the request 
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because the National Bank Act and its implementing regulations expressly 
prohibited state officials from exercising “visitorial powers” over national banks. 
Id. at 524. No similar federal statute proscribes the Attorney General’s subpoena.   
The district court also relied Voicenet Comm. Inc. v. Corbett, 2006 WL 
2506318 (E.D. Penn. August 30, 2006) as basis for jurisdiction under the CDA. 
There, plaintiffs alleged a violation of their rights under the CDA due to the 
execution of a search warrant and enforcement of state law, which criminalized the 
knowing distribution and possession of child pornography. Id. at *1. The Attorney 
General concedes that the district court there said the CDA conferred an 
enforceable right under § 1983, but it stands alone in that proposition. Contra 
Klayman v. Facebook, Inc., 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“[p]reemption 
under the [CDA] is an affirmative defense. . . .”).  
Further, the Attorney General has not “seized” any of Google’s materials, as 
in Corbett, and Google does not contend that the MCPA is inconsistent with the 
CDA. The Attorney General only has requested information, and only a state court 
can enforce that request. The CDA and federal preemption thus are being used as 
preemptory defenses to a future state law cause of action—one that may or may 
not ever be brought. If a suit under the MCPA ever is brought, Google can raise its 
immunity/preemption defenses and have its day in court—just not federal court 
and just not today.  
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Finally, the Fourth Amendment issue raised in this litigation warrants further 
consideration. There is no likelihood of success, but the “Fourth Amendment” also 
would amount only to an “overly broad” defense, if to anything at all, in state court 
because it is being used as a subpoena narrowing device. For its Fourth 
Amendment action, Google places its eggs in one legal basket: Major League 
Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2003).   
 As noted, the subpoena issued in Crist fell squarely within the “business of 
baseball” exemption from federal antitrust law, and it was clear that the conduct 
being investigated could not possibly violate any state antitrust laws. Id. at 1186. 
Significantly, in invoking the Fourth Amendment, the court in Crist only had to 
look to the four corners of the face of the subpoena to decide the issue. Id.; accord 
NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 363 (“no inquiry beyond the four corners … needed to 
determine whether it is facially pre-empted.”).  
That is not the case here. Google’s claim centers on the scope of the 
subpoena. Google thus is invoking the Fourth Amendment as a method to narrow a 
purportedly over-broad state administrative subpoena. If Google’s logic is 
accepted, the Fourth Amendment will be transformed from an instrument to 
prohibit unlawful search and seizure into a mechanism for initial review in federal 
court of all state administrative subpoenas. Following Google’s rationale, the 
federal courts will be required to parse through document requests and narrow state 
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administrative subpoenas if and when the recipient of the subpoena thinks it may 
be overly broad.  
This is a perverse exercise of federal jurisdiction, and procedurally wrong. 
Indeed, even if the federal courts are to be the “first stop” for narrowing state 
administrative subpoenas, the federal courts cannot be the “last stop,” as the state 
court is the only one that can enforce the subpoena. Whatever else might be said 
about Crist’s holding, it is not that. 
CONCLUSION 
The preliminary injunction remedy always has been considered an 
“extraordinary and drastic remedy, not to be granted routinely.” Holland Am. Ins. 
Co. v. Succession of Roy, 777 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir. 1985).  Not anymore. In one 
fell swoop, specific immunities provided by federal law have been judicially 
expanded; an investigation under unchallenged state authority halted; future 
hypothetical “charges” are precluded; and a State’s sovereignty has been usurped.  
Simply because a federal court has federal power to issue an injunction does 
not mean it always can, or even always should.  Indeed, on this occasion, the 
exercise of that power was wrong on many fronts. This Court should analyze the 
several paths to reversal and overturn the unprecedented preliminary injunction 
under one of them.     
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This, the 22nd day of June, 2015. 
 
 
       /s/ Krissy C. Nobile    
       Krissy C. Nobile 
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